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The average cost overrun for producing the Olympic Games
has been more than 200% since 1976
Will Jennings explores the history of vast cost overruns for Olympic Games. He isolates
three common factors behind grossly underestimated costs since 1976: the bid process,
uncontrolled growth in project specifications, and the failure to identify and manage risk.
As recently as March, the Public Accounts Committee crit icised the organizers of  London
2012 f or its rising security bill: “It is staggering that the original estimates were so wrong.”
The more things change, the more they stay the same. “Olympic balance-sheets, like
other budgets” wrote the organizers of  the London 1908 Olympic Games “are in the habit
of  proving their healthy existence by a vigorous growth.” This maxim has long been known in planning f or
the world’s largest sporting event.
The f inal report of  the f irst modern Olympics in 1896 ref lected that the init ial estimates had “vastly
underrated” the cost of  restoring the ancient Panathenaic Stadium in Athens, rising some 57 per
cent f rom 585,000 to 920,000 Drachmas. Famously, the bid estimates of  the Montreal 1976 Olympics
were put at a modest C$120 million, but suf f ered an eventual cost overrun of  1,250 per cent -  leaving
huge debts which took the city thirty years to pay of f . All this af ter the Mayor of  Montréal Jean Drapeau
had f amously declared “The Olympics can no more have a def icit than a man can have a baby.” Despite
an increasing concern on the part of  host cit ies with managing risk, the problem of  cost over-runs does
not seem to have been resolved in recent t imes.
In Olympic Risks I document the systematic occurrence of  cost overruns at Olympic Games since 1976,
and explore some of  the reasons why init ial f orecasts turn out to be so wrong. This research is the f irst
to combine systematic analysis of  Olympic cost overruns over t ime and an examination of  their causes.
Between 1976 and 2012, the average cost overrun f rom the estimates presented in the bid book to the
f inal cost was more than 200 per cent. This f ar exceeds the average cost overrun on other major
projects identif ied in existing studies. It is also despite considerable ef f orts on the part of  the
International Olympic Committee over the past decade to make the evaluation of  bids more rigorous via
the technical requirements of  its candidature process.
There are many explanations of  cost inf lation in major projects, ranging f rom ‘optimism bias’ or ‘group
think’ in decision-making, deception on the part of  planners, poor project management, and f ailures of
the polit ical system itself  to provide oversight. Through an investigation of  the f actors behind each
Olympic cost overrun, f rom Montreal in 1976 to London in 2012, a number of  common themes emerge.
1. The bid process
The IOC’s Olympic Games Study Commission has itself  expressed concern that the competit ion f or the
right to the host the Olympic Games, awarded through a secret vote of  the membership of  the IOC,
encourages ‘showcasing’ by applicant cit ies in their submissions. Indeed, bid books have been described
by Richard Pound, f ormer Vice President of  the IOC, as being the ‘most beautif ul f iction’. A f easibility
study conducted f or the Brit ish Olympic Association ahead of  London’s bid itself  expressed the need f or
‘escaping f rom the world of  realism’ when considering what a bid might look like. The short- term interest
in securing the event can lead to under-estimation of  the commitment required. As a consequence, the
version of  events that are presented in bid dossiers of ten have litt le resemblance to the real thing.
2. Scope creep
One of  the most prominent causes of  cost overruns in project management is ‘scope creep’ (i.e.
uncontrolled growth in project specif ications). This can result f rom inadequate def init ion of  the project
scope or poor controls in management (it can also result f rom drif t in the pref erence of  planners). For
example, changes to the design of  the stadium roof  led to cost pressures f or the main stadium f or
London 2012. Another crucial source of  scope creep is unanticipated exogenous shocks, such as
f luctuations in steel prices. Subsoil exploration – that is, drilling – has been a recurring theme in Olympic
construction. Designs of  the velodrome f or Montreal had to be modif ied due to the discovery of  weak
and unstable subsoil which had been missed by earlier geological studies – f urther pushing costs
upwards. Unexpected f indings about the soil prof ile of  the site f or the Athens 2004 Olympics led to a last
minute change in design of  the f oundations f or the stadium roof . A £25 million increase in the cost of  the
velodrome f or London 2012 was similarly attributed to changes in design that resulted f rom ‘complex
f oundations and ground conditions’.
The phenomenon of  scope creep is also observed in budgeting (re)classif ication. Much of  the growth in
the of f icial budget f or London 2012 can be linked to this, in the redef init ion of  certain items as core
Olympic costs af ter the bid had been won. Specif ically, £1 billion of  expenditure on inf rastructure f or the
Olympic Park was re- integrated into the budget while the costs of  tax liabilit ies on capital spending and
security, which had been omitted f rom previous estimates, were consolidated into the budget. These
omissions, combined with the addition of  a sizeable programme contingency, amounted to more than £4
billion; f ar more than the increases in costs due to changes in technical scope.
3. Risk, moral hazard and fantasy documents
One of  the most important f actors in Olympic cost overruns is a f ailure to identif y and manage risk. This
is despite the increasing attention of  Olympic organizers to risk in planning. The Public Accounts
Committee f ound that London’s bid budget had not f ollowed the government’s own guidance on
budgeting procedures f or major projects ‘despite HM Treasury having been consulted and the bid agreed
across Government’. Specif ically, £738 million of  private sector f inance f or the Olympic Village was
included ‘despite not being supported by robust analysis’. When the global f inancial crisis hit the private
sector withdrew f rom the project, only returning later once the level of  risk attached to the project had
subsided. This points to the problem of  moral hazard in major events where the government is required
to act as backer of  last resort (f or the Olympics this is enshrined through the host city contract), which
enables the private sector to transf er risk to the state but seek to accrue prof its. Private developers
returned to the Olympic Village project once the volatility in the f inancial markets had calmed down.
The f inal aspect of  Olympic planning that gives rise to the under-estimation of  risk is the illusion of
control created through the use of  detailed planning documents and complex budgeting methods. The
numbers presented in bid books of ten take on a f ictional character, having litt le resemblance to the f inal
cost as plans f or the event take shape and as uncertainties of  scope diminish. In the case of  London
2012, the application of  a series of  technical methodologies (which included a probabilistic budget
assessment and f inancial audits) were unable to prevent revisions of  technical scope and drif t in polit ical
and bureaucratic decisions (such as growth in the security budget). This points to the possibility of
viewing Olympic planning in the same way as Lee Clarke’s characterization of  disaster plans as ‘f antasy
documents’, where organisations f antasise about their ability to cope with disaster.
In this, planning manuals and protocols are of ten used to ‘express uncertainty in terms of  risk’ and to
provide reassurance about manageability to an external audience. This has many parallels with the role
of  bid books in securing the support of  host governments and cit izens as well as the IOC. Most of  all,
this highlights the gap between the organisational rhetoric of  planning, and how it characterises routines
and controls, and reality on the ground.
For more detailed analysis of bid budgets see Chapter 4 of Olympic Risks, and for an analysis of the budget
for London 2012 see ‘Why costs overrun: risk, optimism and uncertainty in budgeting for the London 2012
Olympic Games’, Journal of Construction Management and Economics 30(6): 455-462.
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